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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
----------------------------------
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
ALVIN I. SMITH 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No.11256 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Because appellant has included in his 
Statement of Facts so many extraneous matters 
totally unrelated to the issues of this 
case, the respondent chooses to make his 
own statement of facts: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John Elwood Dennett, plaintiff-appel I ant, 
commenced an action in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, against Alvin I. Smith by a summons and complaint, 
the significant portions of which consisted of the following 
al I egations: 
11 3. That during the months of September, October 
and November 1967 defendant mode, declared and 
1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
published to one Phil Phillips, and others, 
certain derogator and libellous (sic.) statements 
re ating and pertaining to the p aintiff, which 
tended to degrade and discredit him, to plaintiff's 
special and general damage. 
11 4. That the statements made were without truth, 
merit, or substance, and were intentionally made 
for the purpose of purveying and promulgating 
malicious untruths and gossip, and for no other 
purpose which entitled plaintiff to punitive damages. 
115. That the amount and extent of damage has not 
yet been ascertained, but will be supplied by way 
of amendment to plaintiff's complaint. 
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays special, general and 
punitive damages be awarded in his favor and against 
defendant in such amount as the evidence sustains, 
together with costs and other appropriate relief." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Contrary to the recitation (on page 3 of plaintiff's 
brief) of things Mr. Smith purportedly told Mr. Phillips, 
plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any hint of the nature of 
the alleged "derogatory and libellous (sic) statements." 
2 
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Thereafter, Smith served on Dennett, who was 
acting as his own attorney, a Motion to Dismiss, alleging 
(I) that the complaint fails to state a claim against 
defendant upon which relief can be granted, and (2) that 
the plaintiff has been adjudicated a bankrupt and is not 
the proper party to bring such action. 
A hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss was 
held on March 12, 1968 before the Honorable Leonard W. 
Elton, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court. Judge 
Elton ruled that the plaintiff's complaint was deficient in 
that it failed to state verbatim the alleged defamatory 
words; and thereupon, on April 3, 1968 entered an order 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint unless the plaintiff amended 
his complaint within 20 days. Plaintiff apparently elected 
to stand on the legal sufficiency of his complaint, and 
after the 20 days al lowed for amendment had elapsed 
plaintiff fi I ed a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRATED 
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 8{a) AND WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED. 
POINT 11. THE EFFECT ON THIS CASE 0:: PLAINTIFF'S 
PENDING BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS. 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT DOES 
NOT STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF 
CAN BE GRANTED AS REQUIRED BY 
RULE 8(a) AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED. 
Respondent intends in this Point to answer al I of 
the issues raised in Points, One, Two, and Three of 
appel I ant's brief on appeal. 
Historically it has always been necessary in an 
action for I ibel or slander to set forth in the complaint 
sufficient al I egations to show that the statement or matter 
complained of is defamatory as to the plaintiff. Under 
the early English practice the pleading of an action for 
defamation was highly technical; and many cases have 
been lost for minute variances between the pleading and 
the proof. Under the common law form of action for 
defamation it was necessary to set forth certain technical 
al legations known as the innuendo, the inducement and 
the colloquium in order to have a legally sufficient 
pleading. With the adoption of code pleading, these 
requirements were relaxed somewhat. However, it was, 
and is, sti 11 necessary to set out the defamatory words 
verbatim in the complaint. The only modification of 
this requirement is that many states will permit the libel 
or slander complained of to be set out in substance and 
effect. The general rule is well stated in 33 Am. Jur.-
Libel and Slander - Sec. 237, as follows: 
4 
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"While some courts have held that the libel or 
slander complained of may be set out in substance 
and effect, the great weight of authority supports 
the view that in the absence of any statutory 
provision to the contrary, it must be repr:>duced 
verbatim, not only in order to enable the court 
to determine whether it is in fact defamatory, but 
also to apprize the defendant of the exact charge 
that he wi II be cal I ed upon to answer. 11 
One leading authority for this statement is Kirby v. 
Martindale, 19 S. D. 394, 103 N. W. 648 (1905). In 
that case the material part of the complaint with respect 
to the defamation stated as follows: 
11 
••• that in the 1903 issue of the said Law Directory 
the defendant wrongfully, wilfully, injuriously, 
maliciously, and without any justifiable cause 
printed and published ••• of, about, concerning, 
and touching this plaintiff in his professional 
standing, a certain libelous statement and publication, 
the substance and effect of which was that this 
plaintiff was a second-rate lawyer, of only fair 
standing, and worth only some $10 ,000 to $20 ,000 
•••• 
11 (Emphasis added.) 
The defendant filed a demurrer, which the lower court 
sustained; and thereafter, upon the plaintiff's appeal, 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota said: 
5 
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"The rule seems to be well settled, that in a complaint 
for libel the libelous publication must be set out in 
the complaint, and that it is not sufficient to set out 
therein the publication in its 'substance and effect.' 
"In Bradstreet vs. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W.753 ..• 
the Supreme Court of Texas speaking upon this subject says: 
1 The petition does not set out in haec verba the very 
language of the I ibel but pretends to give its substance 
and meaning * * * A libel suit is based on language, or 
its equivalent. The complaint in a libel suit should put 
the court in possession of the libelous matter published--
the language used, with such innuendoes as are necessary 
to explain what was meant by the language and to whom 
it applied--so as to enable the court to determine 
whether the words are actionable. In this case the 
complaint attempts to give the meaning of the language 
only, without stating what the libel was. If the libel 
consisted in reporting plaintiff's standing, as mentioned, 
in blank, the complaint should have informed the 
court ond the defendant of the fact with such explana-
tiol"li as to what was meant by the report as were neces-
sary to show that the report was injurious and defamatory 
It is not sufficient in this kind of a suit to state 
the substance of the language used or its meaning. We 
believe the general demurrer ought to have been 
sustained .••• 1 
"It is quite clear, therefore, that the complaint as to 
the alleged libel, published in 1903, was insufficient, 
6 
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and the demurrer was properly sustained to that 
cause of action or clause of the complaint. 11 
On January I, 1950 the State of Utah adopted Rules 
of Ci vi I Procedure, modeled after the Federal Rules. Since 
that time, the sufficiency of a complaint has been governed 
by Rule 8(a}, which states as follows: 
11 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, shall conatin (1) a 
short and plain statement of the claim, showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand 
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several 
different types may be demanded. 11 
In this brief, appe II ant disputes the present applica-
bility of the above quotation from Am. Jur. and the Kirby 
case on the basis that both were published prior to the 
adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On JXlge 13 of his 
brief, he notes that the first series of Am. Jur. is being 
revised, and speculates that the revised volume on libel and 
slander, when published, will announce a different rule. It 
is significant that appel I ant offers this speculation as a substi-
tute for case authorities. In fact, there are no cases before 
or after the adoption of the Rules, which support appellant's 
view of the law. However, there are cases, even after the 
adoption of the Rules, which reaffirm the necessity of alleging 
the defamatory matter verbatim. · 
7 
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In the case of Watwood vs. Credit Bureau, Inc., 
68 A. 2d 905 (Mun. Ct. App., D. C. 1959), the plaintiff 
filed an action against the Credit Bureau, Inc., alleging 
that the defendant 
11
made false and libelous statements 
as to the financial situ1Jtion of the plaintiff, as to her 
marital status, and other libelous information which was 
untruthful and false. 
11 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint. The trial court entered its order granting the 
motion to dismiss; the plaintiff appealed. In its decision, 
the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
acknowledged the liberalizing effect of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but held as follows: 
"Dismissal of the complaint was plainly correct. 
The weight of authority is that a complaint for 
libel should set forth the alleged defamatory matter 
verbatim, although some authorities hold that it is 
sufficient to state the substance and effect of the 
defamatory words. 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, 
164; 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, 237. Here 
neither the I anguage nor its substance was set forth. 
The allegation that defendants made 'libelous state-
ments' is a bare legal conclusion with nothirgin the 
complaint to supportthe conclusion. Appellant 
argues that her complaint is sufficient under the trial 
court's Rule No. 8, based on Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 8, 28 U. S.C. A., which requires that_ 
a complaint 'shall contain a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
judgment thereon'. Appellant's statement is short 
but not plain. It does not show appellant is entitled 
to relief. We do not understand that even the 
8 
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most liberalized system of pleading permits 
a statement of a claim by a legal conclusion. 11 
To the same general effect, see, Garcia v. Hilton 
Hotels, 97 F. Supp.5 (D.C. Puerto Rico, 1951). 
In the case of Heathman v. Hatch, 13 U.2d 266, 
372 P .2d 990 (1962) this court had occasion to examine the 
sufficiency of a complaint as judged by Rules 8(a} and 
9(1). This court said: 
11 The objective of these rules is to require that the 
essential facts upon which redress is sought be set 
forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty 
so that it can be determined whether there exists a 
legal basis for the relief claimed; and, if so,so that 
there will be a clearly defined foundation upon 
which further proceedings by way of responsive 
pleadings and/or trial can go forward in an orderly 
manner. 11 (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, it would appear that the adoption of Rule 8(a} did 
not change the former requirement that the defamatory matter 
be set out verbatim in the complaint. 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Ci vi I Procedure relates 
to a miscellaneous assortment of mattersvl.1 ich may or must 
be treated specially in pleading. Rule 9 (j) (I) states as 
fol lows: 
9 
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"It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander 
to set forth any extrinsic facts showing the applica-
tion to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out 
of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to 
state generally that the sane was pub I ished or 
spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation 
is controverted, the pcrty alleging such defamatory 
matter must establish on the trial, that it was so 
published or spoken. 
While this Section obviously changes some of the things 
which had to be pleaded, it has no application to the 
requirement that the defamatory words be set forth verbatim. 
Under the common law requirements of pleading, the plaintiff 
had to show that he was the person defamed. Where the 
publication forming the subject matter of the action did not 
contain any direct reference to the plaintiff, the complaint 
had to set forth such extrinsic facts as were necessary to 
show the application of the defamatory words to the plaintiff. 
This was called the colloquium. Thus, for example, in the 
case of Shaw Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. vs. Des Moines 
Dress Club, 245 N. W. 231 {Iowa), the plaintiff in its 
complaint alleged that the defendant had published an 
advertisement in a newspaper containing words as follows: 
"Garments cleaned at half price are only half 
cleaned. 
"When you buy cleaning for half price, you get 
10 
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just what you pay for ••• half way cleaning and 
pressing. 11 
While these words on their face do not seem to be defamatory 
the plaintiff further alleged by way of the colloquium that th~ 
plaintiff for several weeks prior thereto had been advertising 
a cleaning sale using the phrase, "Half price for the second 
garment", and that at the said time no other per.son or firm 
in the cleaning business in the vicinity of Des Moines was 
advertising cleaning at half price. These allegations were 
necessary under the former statutes relating to pleadings 
in order to show that the defamatory matter applied to the 
plaintiff. However, under the provisions of Rule 9 (j} (1) 
the plaintiff's complaint could merely have stated the words 
published and alleged that the same were published concern-
ing the plaintiff. 
Furthermore, it should not be thoughtthat Rule 
9 (j) (1) is a I iberal innovation which started in Utah 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, Rule 9 (j} (1) 
has no corresponding subject in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but rather was taken from Section 104-13-9, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and was inserted into the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in order to preserve a liberaliz-
ing element first adopted in Utah under code pleading prior 
to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The code form of Section 104-13-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, and its preservation in Rule 9 (i) (1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civi I Procedure merely affect the 
manner in which a plaintiff pleads the common law collo-
quium; it does not change any other allegation necessary 
11 
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to be pleaded in a defamation action; and particularly, 
it does not remove the necessity for setting forth verbatim 
in the complaint the alleged defamatory words. 
POINT II. THE EFFECT ON THIS CASE OF 
THE PLAINTIFF'S PENDING BANKRUPTCY 
PROCEEDING. 
On September 14, 1967 appellant filed a voluntary 
petition in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah under the provisions of Chapter XI I of the Bankruptcy 
Act. Subsequently (but prior to the filing herein) the 
United States District Court entered its order adjudicating 
appel I ant a bankrupt and directing that the bankruptcy be 
proceeded with pursuant to the provisions of Chapters I 
through VI I of the Bankrup\·cy Act. 
At the hearing of this case before Judge Elton, 
respondent conceded that the pendency of the bankruptcy 
proceedings would have no effect on the rights of the 
plaintiff (rather than his TrU>tee in Bankruptcy) to commence 
the action herein as the real party in interest. Respondent 
does not intend to argue differently before this court. 
However, whether the appel !ant is bankrupt or not has 
no effect on 1he sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully 
submits that the action of the District Court was clearly 
correct in dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and that the order 
of dismissal should be affirmed. 
13 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN G. MARSHALL 
Tuft and Marshal I 
53 fc st Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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